【在香港如何做護士】(2020年7月更新版)
誰想到十多年後的今天香港醫護要再一次面對疫症,過去半年我們多次吶喊,當權者都視而不見。而在大家默默地盡心盡力抗疫之際,醫管局卻以「凍薪」作答謝... 做醫護並沒有特別偉大,在香港更可說是「賤過地底泥」;但我們知道 #如果可磊落做人你會更吸引 。入行者,敬請勿忘初心。
▶敬告文字小偷,請自重。◀
一、大學學位課程
- 五年制
- 畢業後會得到護理學學士及註冊護士資格
- 於大學上課,到醫院實習
1. 理工大學(護理學理學士 / 精神健康護理學理學士)
- 最低收生要求3322+33 (只限甲類科目) ,有修生物科優先
護理學:
https://sn.polyu.edu.hk/…/bachelor_of_science_…/index_m.html
精神健康護理學:
https://sn.polyu.edu.hk/…/bachelor_of_science_…/index_m.html
2. 中文大學(護理學士)
- 最低收生要求3322+33 (考獲3級的其一必須為理科)
http://www.nur.cuhk.edu.hk/…/undergrad…/bachelor-of-nursing/
3. 香港大學(護理學學士)
- 最低收生要求3322+33
https://nursing.hku.hk/educat…/bachelor-of-nursing-full-time
(非理科生入學後需額外上生命科學課程 Life Science Enrichment Programme)
4. 公開大學(護理學學士普通科 / 護理學學士精神科)
- 最低收生要求3322+2,有修理科或「健康管理與社會關懷」優先
http://www.ouhk.edu.hk/wcsprd/Satellite…
5. 東華學院(護理學健康科學學士)
- 最低收生要求3322+2 (只限甲類科目),英文達4級或以上優先
https://www.twc.edu.hk/en/Programmes/bhsn
6. 明愛專上學院(護理學學士)
- 最低收生要求3322+2 (只限甲類科目),有修生物科優先
https://www.cihe.edu.hk/…/bachelor-…/introduction/index.html
7. 浸會大學持續教育學院(護理學學士)
- 最低收生要求3322+33 (兩科甲類科目或一科甲類科目加「健康護理實務」 / 「中醫藥學基礎」,有修理科優先)
https://www.sce.hkbu.edu.hk/…/…/bachelor-of-nursing-honours/
二、醫院管理局護士學校
- 分兩年制登記護士課程及三年制註冊護士高級文憑課程
- 前者無需學費,但畢業後須於醫管局工作兩年;後者須繳交學費
- 前者只於葛量洪醫院開辦;後者分別於明愛醫院、屯門醫院及伊利沙伯醫院開辦
登記護士(普通科)訓練課程:
- 最低收生要求222 (中英數) + 22
- 中文教學
http://www.ha.org.hk/haho/ho/nursing/enrolled_nurse-b5.htm
(收生期間方有報名詳情)
註冊護士高級文憑課程:
- 最低收生要求3322+2 (必須為理科)
- 英文教學
http://www.ha.org.hk/…/nur…/higher_diploma_in_nursing-en.htm
(收生期間方有報名詳情)
三、私家醫院護士學校
- 兩年制登記護士課程
- 除養和醫院課程以及香港中文大學醫院(浸會醫院協辦)課程為免學費外,其他全須繳交學費
- 畢業後一般會獲聘於受訓醫院工作
1. 聖德肋撒醫院 (法國醫院) St. Teresa Hospital
- 最低收生要求222 (中英數) + 22
- 英文教學
http://www.sth.org.hk/nursing_school_info_1.asp?lang_code=en
2. 養和醫院 Hong Kong Sanatorium & Hospital
- 最低收生要求222 (中英數) + 22
- 英文教學
https://www.hksh.com/school-of-nursing/…/programme/index.php
3. 浸會醫院 Hong Kong Baptist Hospital
- 最低收生要求222 (中英數) + 22,英文科達3級或以上,有修生物科優先
- 英文教學
http://www.hkbhipe.com/…/the-school-of-nursing/higher-dip…/…
4. 仁安醫院 Union Hospital
- 最低收生要求222(中英數)+ 22
- 英文教學
http://www.union.org/nursingschool/prodetail.php
5. 香港中文大學醫院 CUHK Medical Centre
<浸會醫院護士學校協辦>
- 最低收生要求222 (中英數) + 22,英文科達3級或以上,有修生物科優先
- 英文教學
*暫無2020年度招生消息
http://www.cuhkmc.hk/zh-hant/about_us/background/
四、 其他兩年制登記護士高級文憑課程
1. 公開大學(普通科 / 精神科護理學高級文憑)
- 最低收生要求222 (中英數) + 22
- 中文教學
http://www.ouhk.edu.hk/wcsprd/Satellite…
2. 東華學院(護理學高級文憑)
- 最低收生要求22 (中英) + 222 (不多於兩科應用學習科目)
- 英文教學
https://www.twc.edu.hk/en/Programmes/hdn
五、社福界登記護士課程(普通科 / 精神科)
- 由社會福利署與公開大學合辦
- 無需學費,但畢業後須於社福界工作兩年
- 最低收生要求222 (中英數) + 22
- 中文教學
http://www.ouhk.edu.hk/wcsprd/Satellite…
附錄一:有機會銜接各護理學課程之副學位課程
1. HKUSPACE
護理學副學士
https://www1.hkuspace.hku.hk/…/associate-of-nursing-studies/
社康照顧高級文憑
https://hkuspace-plk.hku.hk/…/higher-diploma-in-health-and…/
2. 理工大學 HKCC(健康學副學士)
https://www.hkcc-polyu.edu.hk/…/assoc…/programmeDetails.php…
3. 中文大學 CUSCS(健康護理高級文憑)
http://scs-hd.scs.cuhk.edu.hk/…/health-social-…/health-care/
4. 東華學院(健康科學高級文憑)
https://www.twc.edu.hk/en/Programmes/hdhsc
5. 公開大學
醫療護理高級文憑
http://www.ouhk.edu.hk/wcsprd/Satellite…
健康學文憑 (社區健康護理)
*合資格升讀的課程為公開大學護理學高級文憑(登記護士)
http://www.ouhk.edu.hk/wcsprd/Satellite…
6. 明愛專上學院(健康護理高級文憑)
https://www.cihe.edu.hk/…/higher-d…/introduction-/index.html
附錄二:已考取非護理學大學學位者可報讀之「註冊前護理學碩士課程」
- 三年全日制
- 畢業後會得到護理學碩士及註冊護士資格
1. 理工大學( 護理學碩士(註冊前) )
- 最低收生要求
HKCEE 5科合格,包括英文 D (Level 3)、生物/化學/物理/數學 E 及 任何一科 C
或
HKDSE 3322+2 (只限甲類科目)
- 持有香港認可的大學學士學位
http://sn.polyu.edu.hk/…/postg…/master_of_nursing/index.html
2. 中文大學( 護理科學碩士(註冊前) )
- 最低收生要求
i. HKCEE 5科合格,包括英文 D (Level 3)、生物/化學/物理/數學 E 及 任何一科 C
或
HKDSE 4322+2 (只限甲類科目)
ii. HKALE 英文 E 或 HKDSE 英文 Level 4
- 持有香港認可的大學學士學位,並不低於二級榮譽
http://www.nur.cuhk.edu.hk/…/master-of-nursing-science-pre…/
☆ 延伸閱讀:
1.《註冊護士 VS 登記護士 & 大學課程 VS 護士學校》
https://www.facebook.com/…/a.100537296616…/999328873431497/…
2. 《護士的職責》
https://www.facebook.com/…/a.100535385616…/740958522601868/…
3. 《人手問題?護士荒、護士專業化、去護士化三者關係你要知》
https://www.facebook.com/…/a.60349541968…/1035928493104868/…
同時也有1部Youtube影片,追蹤數超過2萬的網紅FF教室,也在其Youtube影片中提到,?下面有主題目錄,直接跳轉? 我地創作者團隊不斷製作左各式各樣嘅影片、文章 (由讀書、DSE到大學生活都有),都放左上Flowsophic了!? 另外知道在場有好多中四中五嘅同學,上面有各款幫到你地嘅DSE筆記同Past Paper,快啲去支持下啊! ?Instagram帳號: https://...
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【#TheDiplomat: 沈旭暉隨緣家書英文版🇭🇰】很久沒有向國際關係評論網 The Diplomat 供稿,但國際線十分重要,不應放棄。這次他們希望分享23條、國安法、反恐法風雨欲來的「新香港」前瞻,願國際社會能多了解快將出現的危機:
While the world is preoccupied with a fight against the COVID-19 pandemic, Beijing has been tightening its political grip on all aspects of Hong Kong’s civil society. Rumor has it that Beijing will push through legislating national security laws under Article 23 of Hong Kong’s Basic Law by unconventional means, such as massively disqualifying pro-democratic legislators or even directly applying a national law, widely argued as a major step to destroy the rights and freedom of Hong Kongers, and bring Chinese authoritarianism to Hong Kong.
After the 2019 protests, the administration of Carrie Lam, who theoretically is still leading the special administrative region of China, has little political capital at stake, with its legitimacy reaching rock bottom. The pro-government camp has dwindling prospects for the city’s upcoming Legislative Council election. The government‘s ”nothing to lose“ mentality is apparent from its recent blatant reinterpretation of the Basic Law’s Article 22 (another article that limits the influence of China’s offices in Hong Kong’s internal affairs). The debate is nothing new, but the pressure this time is quite different.
This article highlights the different strategies Beijing could adopt to enact Article 23 insidiously or under disguise to avoid backlash from the international community, while continuing to reap benefits from the city’s globally recognized special status. This seems to be part of Beijing’s brinkmanship to bring Hong Kong protesters and their supporters to their knees and move the city closer to authoritarianism. To counter these moves, Hong Kongers must define the boundaries beyond which Hong Kong falls into authoritarian rule and make a case as to why the city’s downfall is detrimental to the international community‘s interest.
The Long-Term Controversy Over National Security Laws
Back in 2003, the implementation of Article 23 was thwarted by the moderate pro-establishment politician James Tien. In face of overwhelming public disapproval of the law, he withdrew support and votes from his Liberal Party. However, 17 years later, it is hard to imagine Beijing following the old legislative playbook: start with a public consultation, followed by public discourse and political debate, and end with the majority rule. This playbook only works in peaceful societies ruled by a trustworthy government with integrity.
The aftermath of 2003, as well as the 2019 protests, should have taught Beijing and the Hong Kong government a lesson: pushing through national security legislation in a flawed parliament controlled by the minority pro-government camp would inevitably set off another full city-scale protest — and undoubtedly more fierce and focused this time. Given the current government’s numerous displays of dishonesty, it is conceivable that they will embark on a less-traveled path to implement Article 23.
Strategy One: “Anti-Terrorism”
In principle, one possible strategy could be to directly enact Chinese national law across Hong Kong, which can be achieved by declaring a state of emergency in the city. However, this is risky business as it would tarnish the integrity of “one country two systems” and subsequently Hong Kong’s international standing. Beijing, a risk-averse regime, is also unwilling to see Hong Kong’s status as a middleman for laundering money disappear into thin air.
Instead, Beijing could be concocting a narrative that would see Chinese national law applied to Hong Kong while not damaging Hong Kong’s international standing and Beijing’s own interests. The key word in this script is “anti-terrorism.” As early as 2014, pro-Beijing scholars have been claiming the emergence of “local terrorist ideology” on Hong Kong soil. Since the anti-extradition bill protests last year, government rhetoric frequently described the protests, which caused no deaths at all in the entire year, with phrases like “inclination to terrorist ideology.” That was a signal to the world that Hong Kong’s internal conflicts had ballooned into a national security issue. This gives the government the legitimacy to justify the implementation of Chinese national laws across the highly autonomous region to counter terrorism. The Chinese government knows that if it can persuade the world that terrorism exists in Hong Kong, and that it is as severe as the terror threat facing many other nations today, the international community will be less critical of Beijing’s actions in Hong Kong. Enacting Chinese laws directly is a convenient path that will save Beijing from having to tackle Hong Kong’s internal conflicts, basically turning the Hong Kong issue into a nonissue.
Strategy Two: Stacking the Legislature by Disqualifying Candidates
An even bolder strategy was probably foretold by a recent incident where the Hong Kong government and Beijing’s agencies for Hong Kong affairs (HKMAO and the Liaison Office) jointly criticized lawmaker Dennis Kwok for filibustering, framing it as “misconduct in public office” and “violating his oath.” It is incomprehensible to claim that filibustering goes against a lawmaker’s main duty; rather, it is common understanding that legislative work includes debating the law and representing public opinion against unreasonable laws. In a parliament controlled by the minority, pro-democratic members representing the majority of Hong Kongers are forced to express their objections using means like filibustering. Wouldn’t a lack of different political opinions turn the legislative branch into a rubber-stamp institution?
The above allegation has set a dangerous precedent for twisting the logic behind a certain provision in the Basic Law to target opposing lawmakers. In other words, to fulfill Beijing’s interpretation of the principal requirement for holding public office in Hong Kong, one could be required to take a meticulously legalistic approach to uphold the Basic Law down to its every single wording. A public official, by this new definition, not only needs to support “one country, two systems” or object Hong Kong independence, but also must abide by every single provision in the Basic Law. Worst of all, based on the previous cases, whether an official’s words or actions oversteps a provision is up to Beijing’s interpretation of his/her “intent.”
If this approach is applied, in the next election, there might be additional official questions for screening candidates like the following: “The Basic Law states that the enactment of Article 23 is a constitutional duty. Failing to support Article 23 legislation violates the Basic Law. Do you support it?” This question would suffice to disqualify even moderate or even pro-establishment candidates like James Tien. Even if any pro-democratic candidates were elected, once Article 23 re-enters the legislative process, they could risk ouster by raising objections.
Despite the absurdity of this tactic, the Chinese regime may just be tempted enough if such a strategy could resolve two of China’s current nuisances — voices of dissent in the Legislative Council and the previous failure to implement Article 23.
Strategy Three: The “Boiling Frog Effect”
Article 23 is not yet implemented, but the dystopian world that the protesters pictured in 2003 is already becoming reality. Regular citizens have been persecuted for “sedition” for sharing their views on social media or participating in legal protests; workers face retaliation for taking part in strikes; corporations are pressured to publicly side with the government’s stance; employees who have the “wrong” political views are fired; schools have been closely monitored for teaching material; protest-supporting fundraisers were framed for money laundering; a retweet or like may lead to persecution, under a colonial-era law. Only now have Hong Kongers woken up to their new reality — although the Basic Law technically protects citizens’ rights to speak, rally, march, demonstrate, and go on strike, the government could enfeeble civil rights by bending antiquated laws and legal provisions. The frequent abuse of law enforcement power on a small scale, such as improper arrests and police violence, is desensitizing the public and the international community. In a few years, Hong Kong will become unrecognizable. This is indeed a clever play on Beijing’s part to slowly strip away Hong Kong’s autonomy and freedom, without causing much international attention.
Counter-Strategies Against Beijing’s Brinkmanship
Beijing’s overarching goal is to hollow out Hong Kong but, at the same time, avoid major backlash from the international community, which could spell the end of the privileged global status of Hong Kong not granted to other Chinese cities. Beijing also aims at preventing single incidents that could cascade down into mass protests as seen in 2003, 2014, and 2019; and eliminating any resistance forces from within Hong Kong’s legislature. The tactics outlined above are typical in a game of brinkmanship.
In response, Hong Kongers in Hong Kong and on the so-called “international frontline” must know their strengths and bargaining chips on this negotiating table with Beijing.
Unlike Xinjiang and Tibet, Hong Kong is a city with transparency and free flow of information. Hong Kongers need to make a case to the world that the protests are not acts of terrorism. Some suggestions include comparing the Hong Kong protests to similar struggles in 20 or so other counties in the world at the present time, none of which were classified as terrorism; collecting a large amount of concrete evidence of the disproportionate use of force by the Hong Kong police; and showing how enacting Chinese national laws in Hong Kong will end the city’s autonomy and spell disaster for international community‘s interests.
The Legislative Council is the institution that can counteract Beijing’s “boiling frog” strategy and to keep Hong Kongers’ hope alive in the system. Those who plan to run for legislative office must be prepared to be disqualified from running. If only individuals are banned, there need to be alternative candidates as back-up plans. However, if and when the disqualification process is applied broadly to entire camps of candidates (for example, all who object to Article 23), the pro-democracy camp must make a strong case to the Hong Kong and global public that this is the endgame for Hong Kong democracy. Then the incumbent popularly elected legislators will hold the internationally recognized mandate from the public and serve as the last resistance.
These recommendations delineates how the slogan “if we burn, you burn with us,” often seen in the protests, may play out in the game of international relations. If the national security laws are “passed” by a legislature that is jury-rigged in this manner, or if related national laws are directly implemented in Hong Kong, Hong Kongers should signal clearly to the world that it goes way beyond the promised “one country, two systems.” Crossing this red line by Beijing should be seen by the world as a blunt violation of its promised autonomy to Hong Kongers. At that time, if the international community led by the United States and the United Kingdom decided to revoke the “non-sovereignty entity” status of Hong Kong and regard the SAR as an ordinary Chinese city, it shouldn’t come as a surprise.
Dr. Simon Shen is the Founding Chairman of GLOs (Glocal Learning Offices), an international relations start-up company. He also serves as an adjunct associate professor in the University of Hong Kong, Chinese University of Hong Kong and the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, and associate director of the Master of Global Political Economy Programme of the CUHK. The author acknowledges Jean Lin, Coco Ho, Chris Wong, Michelle King, and Alex Yap for their assistance in this piece.
▶️ 高度自治 vs 全面管治
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pwt8wZl8jHQ
cuhk master 在 健吾 Facebook 的最讚貼文
今年是 5.5k ...
#CU0913
"[CUHK Alumni]
老實講句 灰機是無可避免的
香港大學生Fresh grad平均搵得萬幾銀
但要俾錢嘅items就數之不盡
...
1) 家用
2) Grant loan
3) 拍拖
4) 應酬 (非自願)
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6) Master
7) 去日本台灣 (一年一次坐HKexprese)
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咁嘅日子要捱幾耐?
#我有一個夢想"
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cuhk master 在 FF教室 Youtube 的最佳解答
?下面有主題目錄,直接跳轉?
我地創作者團隊不斷製作左各式各樣嘅影片、文章 (由讀書、DSE到大學生活都有),都放左上Flowsophic了!? 另外知道在場有好多中四中五嘅同學,上面有各款幫到你地嘅DSE筆記同Past Paper,快啲去支持下啊!
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13:44 - 邊間大學生活比較豐富?
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17:03 - HKU的High Table Dinner
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